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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenarios:
(1) Mary Clark, a supervisor at a large company, considers herself an
active proponent of equal promotion opportunities for women. When she begins
to suspect that her own employer discriminates against women, she contemplates
filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
but decides to gather some evidence first. Clark then surreptitiously records a
number of conversations with company executives, hoping to catch them in a
tacit admission of guilt. After this fails, she rifles through the files of the
executives, looking for something incriminating. When the company executives
discover Clark's activities, they accuse her of "corporate disloyalty" and
"snooping. " Clark, well apprised of her civil rights, responds that she was not
being disloyal; rather, she was engaging in "protected activity" under Title VII.
As a result, Clark warns, if'the company attempts to reprimand her in any
manner, she will sue for unlawful retaliation under Title VII.
(2) An Hispanic husband and wife, John and Susan Lopez, work in
different departments at the same company. Mrs. Lopez recently overheard her
supervisor make derogatory comments about Hispanics. She protests to the
company's complaint resolution board about these comments. Within a week of
lodging her complaint, her work space is abruptly moved; her cubicle, formerly
located near a sunny window on the secondfloor, is relocated to a dark, dismal
basement. Moreover, Mrs. Lopez' supervisor begins to send her daily
memoranda criticizing her for the most petty of mistakes.
Throughout this time, Mr. Lopez generally has supported his wife's
complaint but has done nothing overt to aid her. Nevertheless, his supervisor
informs him that if his wife does not retract her claim, there will be
"consequences "for the couple. Mrs. Lopez does not retract her claim, and Mr.
Lopez soon isfiredfrom his job. They both then complain to the EEOC, which
issues them permission to sue in federal district court for retaliation under Title
Vii. They do so, whereupon the company moves for summary judgment on both
claims, bringing to the district court's attention that under the law in their
circuit: (a) regardless of its motives, the company has done nothing to Mrs.
Lopez that rises to the level of retaliation under Title VII; and (b) the husband
has no standing to sue under the retaliation clause.
The anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) arm
employees who have denounced alleged workplace discrimination with a cause
of action above and beyond the protection that the three statutes afford against
any actual discrimination; an employer still may be liable for "retaliatory acts"
even after an employee's underlying discrimination claim has failed. However,
as with the substantive issue of what may constitute discrimination under the
[Vol. 63
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respective statutes, federal district court and appellate court decisions vary wildly
regarding what sort of employee and employer actions may implicate the
protection of the anti-retaliation provisions. For instance, in each of the
preceding scenarios, the result to the dilemma posed may differ significantly
according to the federal circuit in which the employee or employer is lucky, or
unlucky, enough to sue or be sued.
In the recent decision of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the United States
Supreme Court resolved one of the hitherto more controverted issues
surrounding Title VII's anti-retaliation provision when it held that an employer
maybe liable for post-employment retaliation.1 However, the Robinson decision
bridges only one of the numerous rifts dividing the United States circuit courts
in regard to the three anti-retaliation provisions. These disagreements among the
courts range from minor differences, such as the evidence necessary to give rise
to an inference of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation, to major
differences, such as who has standing to sue for retaliation and what sort of
action by an employer constitutes retaliation against an employee who has
protested alleged discrimination.
Despite these broad divisions over one of the more fundamental
employment protections in our nation's civil rights laws, and despite employees'
ever-increasing reliance on retaliation claims as a means of recovery,2 there is a
scarcity of published material analyzing the case law on the anti-retaliation
provisions. As a result, this Article offers both a comprehensive treatment of the
major decisions interpreting the anti-retaliation provisions and a critical
evaluation of the conflicts between the courts regarding the protection which the
provisions afford employees. Part II addresses the nature of the three anti-
retaliation provisions and sets out the elements of the prima facie case that a
plaintiff must allege. Part HI deals specifically with what courts have held may
constitute "protected activity," which is the first element of a prima facie
retaliation case.
Part IV concerns the second element of a prima facie retaliation case-the
requirement that an employer have carried out an "adverse employment action"
against the plaintiff-about which there is a clear split in the nation's circuit
courts. Part V of the Article treats the question of the causal link between
protected activity and adverse action. Part VI then lists the damages available
for successful retaliation claimants. Finally, Part VII weighs the competing
* Melissa A. Essary is a professor of employment law at Baylor University School
of Law. She teaches courses in Employment Discrimination, Employment Relations, and
Labor Law. Terence D. Friedman is a May 1997 graduate of Baylor Law School and a
former Senior Notes & Comments Editor of the Baylor Law Review. He is currently a
judicial law clerk to the Honorable James T. Trimble, Federal District Court, Western
District, Louisiana.
1. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 849 (1996).
2. Barbara O'Connell, Retaliation Claims on the Rise, 97 L. WKLY. U.S.A. 204,
BE (1997).
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interests at stake in the courts' recent, conflicting decisions regarding the anti-
retaliation provisions.
It. THE ANTI-RETALIATION CLAUSE
Sections 2000e-3(a) of Title VII, 623(d) of the ADEA, and 12203 of the
ADA make it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee because
she has participated in any investigation or proceeding under the Acts or because
she has opposed the employer's discriminatory practices.3 As with other anti-
retaliation provisions,4 Congress included these sections in their respective Acts
in order to enable employees to engage in statutorily protected activities without
fear of retaliation by their employers.5 All three provisions contain similar
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994)
[hereinafter Title VII], provides in pertinent part that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment... because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.
The Age Discrimination Employment Act [hereinafter ADEA] anti-retaliation
provision, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1994), is almost identical to Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision.
The Americans with Disabilities Act [hereinafter ADA], 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)-(b)
(1994), provides:
No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual
has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because
such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
(emphasis added).
The ADA further provides that it is unlawful to:
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or
enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on
account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the
exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.
Section 1981 of 42 U.S.C., which prohibits intentional racial discrimination,
contains no anti-retaliation clause; as a result, it is unclear whether the statute bars
retaliation. See Suzanne E. Riley, Comment, Employees'Retaliation Claims Under 42
U.S.C. § 1981: Ramifications of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 479
(1996).
4. Other statutes with anti-retaliation provisions include: the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1994), the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994), the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 [hereinafter
OSHA], 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1994), and the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994).
5. EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Mitchell v.
[Vol. 63
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language, and courts regularly rely on Title VII decisions in interpreting ADEA
retaliation cases, and vice-versa.6 In the few cases decided under the recently
enacted ADA, courts have relied on decisions interpreting the anti-retaliation
provisions of both Title VII and the ADEA.7
A. Procedure
A retaliation complainant first must file a charge of retaliation with the
EEOC.8 If the EEOC does not conduct an investigation, the employee may, after
a statutory period has expired, seek from the agency the issuance of a right-to-
sue letter.9 After receiving permission to sue, a plaintiff then has ninety days in
which to file suit against a private employer and thirty days in which to sue the
federal government as an employer." A plaintiff who already has received
permission from the EEOC to sue on a complaint of discrimination need not file
a second complaint with the agency for her retaliation claim; this is because
retaliation claims are deemed "reasonably related" to an original EEOC charge
and, therefore, can be heard despite a plaintiffs failure to raise the claim in a
separate complaint."
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)).
6. See, e.g., Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 n.9 (1st Cir.
1996) ("The analytical framework for ADEA discrimination and retaliation cases was
patterned after the framework for Title VII cases, and our precedents are largely
interchangeable.").
7. See, e.g., Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278,
1287 (1lth Cir. 1997).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1994).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1994).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 16(c) (1994). For a detailed description of Title
VII's filing procedure, see George P. Sape & Thomas J. Hart, Title VllIReconsidered:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,40 GEo. WASH. L. REv., 824, 862-88
(1972).
11. Nealonv. Stone, 958 F.2d 584,590 (4th Cir. 1992). But see Keegan v. Dalton,
899 F. Supp. 1503, 1510-11 (E.D. Va. 1995). In Keegan, the plaintiff failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies because, after filing her EEOC complaint, she was twice
given the opportunity to amend her complaint to specifically include a claim for
retaliation and she twice failed to do so. Id.
In a related matter, courts have also held that a plaintiff whose underlying
discrimination claim is pending before the EEOC may still seek purely equitable relief
in the form of an injunction against retaliatory acts in federal district court. See, e.g.,
Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Sheehan v. Purolator Courier
Corp., 676 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1981); Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69, 73
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974).
1998]
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B. Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) she
engaged in protected activity; (2) her employer took adverse employment action
against her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and
the adverse action." A plaintiff in a retaliation case may establish these prima
facie elements by either offering direct evidence of retaliation or by using the
burden-shifting approach established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.3 In those cases in which there is direct evidence
and/or mixed motives of retaliation, courts have selectively applied the Supreme
Court's holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, as modified by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.14 However, these cases are few and far between. " The
overwhelming majority of courts rely on McDonnell Douglas in analyzing
retaliation claims.
Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme as applied to retaliation cases, if a
plaintiff proves her prima facie case (a burden which has variously been called
"not onerous"16 and "easily met" 7), the defendant is not entitled to summary
judgment and is "force[d]" to proceed with its case by articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. 8 Additionally,
some circuit courts have held that, in limited circumstances, an employer may
concede that its actions meet the elements of retaliation under McDonnell
Douglas while asserting direct evidence of lack of retaliatory intent."' An
employer may not, however, argue that an employee has waived a retaliation
claim through a specific release or otherwise, since waiver of the right to file an
EEOC charge is considered to be against public policy.20
12. Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir. 1994). Some circuits have employed
a slightly modified prima facie case which adds a fourth element requiring that an
employer have knowledge of the employee's protected activity. See, e.g., Harrison v.
Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 80 F.3d 1107, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996). Those courts using
only three elements subsume the fourth element of knowledge into the third element of
causation. See, e.g., Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982).
13. Johnson v. University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 70 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir.
1995) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
14. Douglas E. Ray, Title VllRetaliation Cases: Creating a New Protected Class,
58 U. PIT. L. REv. 405,412 (1997).
15. See, e.g., Veprinsky v. Flour Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 893 (7th Cir. 1996).
16. Jackson v. RKO Bottlers, Inc., 743 F.2d 370, 377 (6th Cir. 1984).
17. Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1987).
18. EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997).
19. See infra Section V.B.
20. EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1987). In contrast,
it is uncertain whether making a settlement offer contingent on a party's withdrawal of
her discrimination complaint may, in some circumstances, constitute retaliation.
Pendleton v. New York Dept. of Correctional Servs., 615 F. Supp. 522, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
[Vol. 63
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Once the defendant has met its burden, the plaintiff then must show that the
defendant's nondiscriminatory reason is merely pretextual; she does this by
proffering what is essentially a second showing of causation, though one with
a higher threshold of proof than the causation shown as part of the prima facie
case.21 This second showing requires evidence that the adverse action would not
have occurred but for the plaintiff's protected activity.22 If a plaintiff produces
this second required showing of causation, she may survive a motion for
summary judgment or be entitled, after a trial on the merits, to have her claim
submitted to a jury.
IM. PROTECTED ACTIVITY
An employee can satisfy the first prima facie element of a retaliation case,
a showing of "protected activity," by alleging in her complaint that she has (1)
"made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing" under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA
(the "participation clause"); or (2) "opposed" an employment practice made
illegal under any one of the three statutes (the "opposition clause").23 These two
clauses generate numerous and distinct legal issues. By far, the most litigated
of the two clauses is the opposition clause; however, the participation clause also
has been more disputed than its plain language might suggest.
A. Participation
1. EEOC Claims
Courts generally apply a liberal standard when determining whether an
employee has participated in a protected activity. Naturally, the filing of an
administrative complaint with the EEOC is a protected activity under the
participation clause.24 Likewise, following a complaint with a suit and deciding
to appeal from a district court's decision of that suit are "protected activit[ies]." 2
Furthermore, where there is evidence that an employer has retaliated in mere
anticipation of an employee filing an EEOC claim, an employee has been held
1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1985). See also infra Section V.
21. Avery, 104 F3d. at 861.
22. Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 1989).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). Participation in state law statutory proceedings
is also considered participation, as is participation in an action of the U.S. Department
of Labor and Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. Mitchell v. Mid-
Continent Spring Co., 583 F.2d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross,
Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
25. Johnson v. Injured Workers' Ins. Fund, No. HAR 92-1702, 1992 WL 281027,
at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 5, 1992).
1998]
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to "participate" in a complaint even before complaining of the harassment.26
Moreover, the participation clause has been extended to protect employees who
have reported employers to the EEOC on behalf of fellow employees and
employees who inform their co-employees of the co-employees' right to bring
an EEOC action.27 Plaintiffs can participate in a complaint by refusing to sign
an affidavit on an employer's behalf during an employment discrimination
investigation. 28 Also, once an employee has participated in an EEOC action
against her employer, she may be protected against retaliation by her union
although the employee's initial complaint was unrelated to her union. 29 Finally,
the anti-retaliation provisions protect mere applicants for employmenf when
those applicants have engaged in protected activities against a former
employer.
30
The merits of a plaintiffs EEOC charge are not relevant to gaining
protection from retaliation under the participation clause.3t Consequently, in
order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff need not establish
that the allegedly discriminatory conduct she participated against actually was
unlawful.32 Importantly, even false and malicious claims brought in an EEOC
complaint have been protected as "participation," as have false claims made
26. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993); Croushom v.
Board of Trustees, 518 F. Supp. 9, 24 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). Similarly, in EEOC
Commission rulings, the EEOC has held that an employee's threat to file an EEOC
complaint may be a protected activity. Westfall v. Postmaster General, 01922687,
3737/E7 (1993); Sellard v. Postmaster General, 01882492, 2008/E2 (1988). However,
where an employee does not intend to file a complaint but is only resentful regarding an
employment factor unrelated to discrimination, a threat to file a complaint may not be
protected. See Dziak v. United States Postal Serv., 01842494, 1463/D3 (1986).
27. Fielder v. Southco Inc., 699 F. Supp. 577, 578 (W.D. Va. 1988); EEOC v.
Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
28. Smith v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 443 F. Supp. 61, 65 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
But see Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 787 F.2d 174, 180 (6th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff not victim
of retaliation where he refused to aid his employer in employer's own independent
investigation of an age discrimination claim).
29. See, e.g., Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 207 (2d Cir. 1991) (where plaintiff
filed EEOC claim against employer, plaintiff's union could be sued for retaliation when
it "acquiesce[d] in a company policy that abridges the statutory rights of the plaintiff").
30. Barela v. United Nuclear Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (D.N.M. 1970)
(employer commits retaliation where it fails to continue processing an application after
discovering that the applicant had filed discrimination charges).
31. Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1969).
32. Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 866 (3d Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 63
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during an EEOC investigation.33 One early Fifth Circuit decision emphasized:
There can be no doubt about the purpose of § 704(a). In unmistakable
language it is to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by
Congress to protect his rights. The Act will be frustrated if the employer may
unilaterally determine the truth or falsity of charges and take independent
action.34
Thus, given the importance of one's ability to "participate" in a discrimination
complaint, courts generally make the clause's protections almost inviolate,
fearing that to do otherwise would chill complaints of discrimination.
2. Employee Engaging in Her Own
Investigation as Participation
For those cases in which employees engage in their own investigations of
discrimination before filing a formal complaint with the EEOC, courts must
weigh the competing interests of an employee in protecting her statutory rights
against those of an employer in maintaining a disciplined workplace. Another
consideration is the plain language of the participation clause, which provides
that an employee is protected so long as she is "participating in any manner in
litigation" under the three acts;35 this is a seemingly broad grant of protection
which some courts have read literally.
For example, in Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Co., an employee, in an
attempt to ensnare his employer, prepared a memorandum suggesting that the
employer was biased against the elderly.36 Later, the plaintiff was fired for
refusing to destroy the memorandum.37 In reinstating the jury's finding of
retaliation, the Second Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff could be viewed as
33. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe, 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969). But
see Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 112 (9th Cir. 1990) (false claims made in an
internal investigation prior to an EEOC investigation and unrelated to discrimination
charges are not protected). See also Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The Ninth Circuit, however, has limited the participation clause to the extent that a
plaintiff must reasonably perceive the alleged discrimination she participates against
under a statute to be the sort of discrimination which that statute actually forbids. For
instance, when an employee protested handicap discrimination by participating in a Title
VII action, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the employee could not reasonably perceive Title
VII to forbid discrimination based on physical disabilities. Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d
138, 142 (9th Cir. 1978). Of course, the Americans with Disabilities Act would now
apply in such a situation.
34. Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1004-05.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
36. Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1569 (2d Cir. 1989).
37. Id.
1998]
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attempting to gather evidence for a lawsuit under the ADEA and therefore "was
participating in any manner in litigation under ADEA."'3
Similarly, in Heller v. Champion International Corp., the plaintiff
surreptitiously recorded exchanges with his employers, attempting to gather
evidence for an ADEA claim. 9 The appellate court conceded that the plaintiff's
conduct was a kind of "disloyalty" but "not necessarily the kind of disloyalty
that under these circumstances would warrant dismissal as a matter of law."4
The court then held that, as in Grant, the plaintiff in Heller "was participating
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation" under the ADEA.4'
In contrast, in O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., a plaintiff
claimed that stealing sensitive personnel documents was protected activity
because he intended to preserve them as evidence for a future ADEA lawsuit
against his employer.42 In evaluating the plaintiff's claim, the Ninth Circuit
specifically balanced "the purpose of the [ADEA] to protect persons engaging
reasonably in activities opposing... discrimination, against Congress' equally
manifest desire not to tie the hands of employers in the objective selection and
control of personnel."43 Regarding the "control" of an employee, the appellate
court wrote that employers had an interest in "maintaining a harmonious and
efficient operation.'"
The Ninth Circuit then applied its balancing test to the facts in O'Day,
concluding that the plaintiff's conduct was a "serious breach of trust" and that
to hold otherwise would be to "provide employees an incentive to rifle through
confidential files looking for evidence that might come in handy in later
litigation."'4 Such an incentive, the court wrote, would afford employees "a
license to flaunt company rules or an invitation to dishonest behavior."4 6 As a
result, the plaintiff was not engaged in protected activity and could be legally
discharged.47
The question of whether an employee's conduct constitutes a prima facie
showing of protected activity under the participation clause also is closely linked
to issues of(l) illegal acts committed pursuant to the opposition clause, and (2)
protected yet disruptive conduct that may provide an employer with a legitimate
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Heller v. Champion Int'l Corp., 891 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1989).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir.
1996).
43. Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984)
(emphasis added).
44. Id. (citing Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 762-63.
47. Id.
[Vol. 63
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reason for adverse action.4" In cases where an employee commits illegal acts in
supposed "opposition" to an employment practice, courts have held that such
• 49
activity receives no statutory protection. In cases where what would otherwise
be protected "participation" or "opposition" renders a workplace disorderly,
courts have held that employers have a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse
actions."0
The boundaries between these three issues, however, are poorly defined and
ripe for litigation; conduct that a plaintiffs attorney characterizes as
participation "in any manner" in a discrimination claim also may be attacked by
an astute defense attorney as illegal opposition, or turned by the defense attorney
into an articulable reason for legitimate discipline.
B. Opposition
The variety of conduct that plaintiffs have attempted to characterize as
opposition to their employers' allegedly unlawful practices is seemingly endless.
Ultimately, though, the challenges that plaintiffs face in alleging protected
activity under the opposition clause tend to settle into three distinct groups,
namely problems arising with regard to: (1) direct protests to an employer, (2)
allegedly discriminatory practices not imputable to the employer, and (3)
allegedly discriminatory practices not related to employment.
1. Protesting Directly to the Employer
First, as with the participation clause, an employee invoking protection
against retaliation need not show that the underlying employer conduct was
actually discriminatory. Rather, a plaintiff s allegations need only show that the
plaintiff had a good faith, reasonable belief that the conduct she opposed was an
unlawful employment practice. 5' The opposition clause differs markedly from
the participation clause in that its good faith requirement means that an employee
may not oppose a practice maliciously or make a claim with knowledge of its
falsehood, as an employee may do under the participation clause. In a recent
Fifth Circuit decision, the plaintiff complained to college officials about an
offensive joke concerning condoms made by her supervisor in her presence.52
48. See infra Sections IuI.B.1, V.B.1.
49. See infra Section IH.B.1.
50. See infra Section m.B.1.
51. Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d
590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d
1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981). See also I-Icks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 90 F.3d 285, 291
(8th Cir. 1996) (analyzing error in district court's decision that although the
defendant/employer discharged the employee/plaintiff in retaliation for filing an EEOC
complaint, the defendant was not liable because its decision was not racially motivated).
52. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 307-09 (5th Cir. 1996).
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She alleged that this single incident created a hostile work environment. 3 The
Fifth Circuit held that, while the incident itself did not constitute a claim for
hostile work environment, the plaintiff could state a claim for retaliatory
discharge for "protesting" what she "reasonable believed" to be illegal conduct
under Title VILI
Conversely, of course, an employer may rebut an employee's allegedly
"reasonable belief' by proving the unreasonableness of the belief. For example,
in another recent case, a husband and wife both were employees of Wal-Mart."5
When the wife complained to Wal-Mart about its administrative opposition to
her husband's workers' compensation claim and Wal-Mart's failure to call or
send flowers to her ill husband, a district court ruled that the wife could not
reasonably believe that the ADA prohibited such employer conduct.1 6 Hence,
the wife had not engaged in protected activity under the opposition clause and
could not sue for retaliatory discharge.57
Courts have accepted informal protests of discriminatory employment
practices as protected activity. Among such informal manners of opposition
are oral complaints to management, invoking an internal grievance procedure,59
writing critical letters to customers, protesting against employment
discrimination by an entire industry or by society in general, telling co-workers
of an intent to file a discrimination charge, and expressing support of co-workers
who have filed formal charges.'
However, an employee's complaint to her employer must be precise in
terms of the employee's grievance and its alleged discriminatory nature. For
example, when an employee's letter to his employer's human resources
department complained only about "unfair treatment in general" and expressed
mere "dissatisfaction that someone else was awarded" a position, the employee
53. Id. at 309.
54. Id. at 305, 309.
55. Deghand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Kan. 1996).
56. Id. at 1015-16 ("Flowers and personal phone calls are simple courtesies which
no one would reasonably believe are a matter of federal right.").
57. Id.
58. Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990).
59. See, e.g., Heam v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 460 F. Supp. 546, 548 (N.D.
Ill. 1978). See also infra Section III.B.2 regarding the adequacy of internal grievance
procedures and the consequences of the lack of an internal grievance procedure.
60. Id. See also Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir.
1997) ("protected conduct" existed where in-house counsel advised two superiors of the
civil rights implications of a lack of female representation in upper management and an
imminent firing of an African-American senior vice president); Sanborn v. Hunt Real
Estate Corp., 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1305, 1307 (W.D.N.Y. Jul. 29, 1994)
("arguably" protected activity existed so as to avoid summary judgment where plaintiff
alleged that she had observed alleged harassment and reported it to her supervisor, after
which her supervisor told her not to disclose what she had seen).
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had not "explicitly or implicitly allege[d]" an ADEA complaint, and, therefore,
writing the letter was not a protected activity.6 In contrast, an employee's letter
to his congressman was sufficiently precise to be "opposition" although it was
inartfully drawn and complained only vaguely about harassment of black
employees at the defendant's bus garage. 62
Additionally, when an employee's opposition to an alleged employment
practice becomes disruptive and/or ultimately unlawful, it is not statutorily
protected, regardless of the employee's motives. For instance, where employees
have engaged in illegal "stall-ins," blocking access roads to a plant, or have
launched an illegal work stoppage to protest alleged racial discrimination in
employment, courts have held that, while such conduct is clearly in opposition
to an employment practice, it is not the sort of opposition that is protected.63
Again, however, this is an area that is ripe for litigation. While defendants
have established certain types of opposition as disruptive or even unlawful,
plaintiffs have successfully characterized similar employee conduct, such as
conning an employer into signing incriminating memoranda, as "participation
in any manner. '
2. Opposing a Practice Not Imputable to an Employer
Employees often oppose practices that are not the sort of practices made
illegal by Title VII. Often, these incidents occur when an employee opposes an
act of discrimination by a co-worker or even a supervisor who does not herself
meet the statutory definition of an employer. In evaluating whether such
plaintiffs have met their prima facie burden, courts' analyses are widely varied;
some appellate courts have held that plaintiffs in these situations fail to allege
protected activity, whereas other courts appear to analyze such cases in terms of
a lack of causal relation to the employer.65
61. Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694,701 (3d Cir. 1995). See also Jurado
v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (disk-jockey's opposition to
a radio station's English-only policy was not opposition to a discriminatory employment
practice but only opposition based on his own personal concern about success).
62. Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 896 (3d Cir. 1993).
63. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 344 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated
on other grounds, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); King v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 476 F. Supp. 495,
499 (N.D. Ill. 1978). See also Hazel v. United States Postmaster Gen., 7 F.3d 1, 4 (lst
Cir. 1993) (holding that refusal to work on account of alleged discrimination is not
protected opposition).
64. See supra note 37.
65. Although the language of the ADA, unlike Title VII or the ADEA, holds any
"person" liable for retaliation, as opposed to any "employer," courts have read this to
mean only employer, as previously defined under Title VII and ADEA decisions;
subsequently, plaintiffs under the ADA may not sue co-employees as "persons" who
brought retaliatory actions against them. Cable v. Department of Dev. Servs. of
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An illustrative example of a court addressing this issue as one of protected
activity is the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Little v. United
Technologies.6 In Little, the plaintiff complained to his employer about a
racially derogatory remark one of his co-workers made at a team meeting, a
complaint for which the plaintiff claimed he was retaliated against by constant
surveillance, scrutiny, and criticism.67 Applying common law agency principles,
the appellate court held that the plaintiffs opposition to his co-employee's
remark was protected activity only if the remark could be attributed to the
employer by the employer's having known of the comment and having failed to
take prompt remedial action.68
In a case with facts similar to those in Little, the Ninth Circuit held that a
plaintiff who was fired after confronting a co-employee to protest a racially
offensive remark the co-employee had made to the plaintiff s trainee should have
directed her opposition at "an unlawful employment practice of an employer, not
an act of discrimination of a private individual. 69
If, however, a plaintiff has not been provided a "reasonable avenue for
complaint" 0 to express her opposition to a co-employee's discriminatory
conduct, that conduct then may be imputed to her employer. Thus, the employee
may be able to establish the existence of a protected activity. In such cases,
courts examine not only whether the employer offered a grievance procedure,
but whether the grievance procedure was adequate, given the gravity of the
plaintiffs complaint. For instance, in Reed v. A. W. Lawrence & Co., a plaintiff
alleged that she was fired for complaining about a co-employee's sexually vulgar
comment. In that case, the Second Circuit upheld a jury finding that the
employer's avenue of complaint about her co-employee was not reasonable.7
Among the evidence supporting the jury's finding was a lack of adequate time
California, 973 F. Supp. 937 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Burke v. Virginia, 938 F. Supp. 320, 324
(E.D. Va. 1996).
66. Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956 (1lth Cir. 1997).
67. Id. at 959.
68. Id. The court's application of agency principles in this area is in keeping with
courts' general application of master-servant law to the substantive question of whether
a supervisor's discrimination can constitute an underlying, unlawful employment action.
See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability
of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L.
REv. 66, 101 (1995).
69. Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141-42 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Even a continuing
course of racial harassment by a co-employee cannot be imputed to the employer unless
the latter both knows of it and fails to take remedial action."). But see EEOC v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1983) (when an employee protests the
actions of her supervisor such opposition is protected activity).
70. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir.
1992).
71. Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1180-81 (2d Cir. 1996).
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for investigation of the claim by the employer, the rapid closing of the
investigation by the employer's investigator, and the fact that the plaintiff did not
know she would be interviewed about the incident before arriving at an
interview with the investigator.72
However, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Little, even when a plaintiff
has failed to impute a co-worker's conduct to her employer, she may still recover
for discrimination by alleging that she reasonably believed the co-employee's
conduct to be a Title VII violation by the employer itself.73 For instance, in
Trent v. Valley Electric Ass'n, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment
against a plaintiffwho had protested to her employer regarding the comments of
an outside contractor-consultant at a seminar.74 Without deciding whether such
a protest was protected activity in and of itself, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
plaintiff only had to .raise a fact question regarding whether she had a
"reasonable belief that it was unlawful under Title VII for her to be subjected to
a series of offensive remarks at a seminar her employer required her to attend."75
However, although a plaintiff may survive the lesser standard of summary
judgment in this manner, at trial a mere "reasonable belief' that certain conduct
constitutes an unlawful employment practice may be unlikely to withstand a
motion for directed verdict.
Although courts approach opposition to a co-employee's practice from
different angles, their decisions appear to rest on the same principle-an
employee must allege a sufficient nexus between the conduct of a third party,
whether an independent contractor, a co-employee, or a supervisor, and her
employer in order to engage in protected activity against that third party.
Ultimately, this basic tenet of principal-agency law underlies the reasoning in
cases viewing the question of co-employee conduct as one of sufficient employer
knowledge, failure to provide a plaintiff with an adequate grievance procedure,
or even causation.'
3. Opposing a Practice Not Related to Employment
Because a plaintiff must oppose an unlawful employment practice, an
employee's otherwise protected activity must be in opposition to her employer's
employment activities, as opposed to other activities an employer may carry out
with regard to the public at large. For instance, in a case where an employee
complained that he was retaliated against for opposing a school district's efforts
to comply with a desegregation directive, the Eighth Circuit found that the
employee's complaint did not relate at all to the "terms and conditions" of
72. Id. at 1181 n.14.
73. Id.
74. Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994).
75. Id. at 526.
76. See infra note 157.
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anyone's employment but rather dealt with "concerns about the school's
responsibility to the student body."' Similarly, where an employee's general
advocacy of women's rights includes rights that could "extend to and include
additional ideas relating to abortion, marriage, and the family," a court has
refused to find that the employee was necessarily advocating particular
employment rights so as to be "opposing" an employment practice.78
C. Mutual Workplace Scenarios:
Retaliation for Someone Else's Protected Conduct
Aside from the issue of how much retaliation an employer may permissibly
carry out against an employee before it counts as an "adverse employment
action," 79 there is no more uncertain area of the case law on retaliation than that
of retaliation against employees who work in the same workplace as spouses,
relatives, or other closely related third parties who have themselves engaged in
protected conduct. Those courts addressing this issue have taken opposite views:
either the discrimination statutes, in general circumstances, bar retaliation actions
by persons uninvolved in a third party's protected conduct or, because of the
purpose of the acts, third-party actions are permissible across the board.
The most-cited case in this area is De Medina v. Reinhardt, in which a
plaintiff who had been discharged sued her employer under Title VII for
retaliation based on her husband's anti-discrimination activities."0 The district
court in De Medina first conceded that, because the anti-retaliation provision
provides only that it is unlawful to retaliate against an individual when "he has
opposed" an unlawful employment practice or when "he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation[,] ....
Congress did not expressly consider the possibility of third-party reprisals."'
's
Nonetheless, the district court concluded: (1) "tolerance of third party reprisals
would, no less than tolerance of direct reprisals, deter persons from exercising
their protected rights under Title VII," and (2) a contrary decision would produce
"absurd results" since the spouse who actually had engaged in protected activity
would have no standing to seek relief based on the adverse action taken against
his spouse. 2
77. Evans v. Kansas City, Missouri Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 98, 100 (8th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1319 (1996).
78. EEOC v. Del Rio Nat'l Bank, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1668, 1670 n.2
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 1975).
79. See infra Section IV.
80. De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 574 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd in part
and remanded in part, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 580 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3).
82. Id. at 580-81.
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Other district courts have arrived at the same conclusion as the court in De
Medina with regard to husbands threatened and discharged because of their
wives' protected activities and with regard to retaliation against other close
familial relatives.83
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has held that Title VII protects an employee
against retaliation for sending a co-worker to protest allegedly discriminatory
policies.8 Although in EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co. the Sixth Circuit explicitly
rejected the plaintiffs argument that "Title VII prohibits employers from
discriminating against any and all third parties in retaliation for a co-employee's
protected activity," the court also reversed the district court's decision that "third
parties who have not actually engaged in protected activities themselves, can
never sue" for retaliation. 5 Citing both De Medina and the rule of statutory
construction that Title VII should not be read so as to frustrate its purpose, the
court in Ohio Edison expressly interpreted the phrase "he [the employee] has
opposed any practice" to mean "he or his representative has opposed any
practice" because it was "consistent with the objective of the Act which is to
prohibit retaliation against protected activity." 6
In marked contrast to the foregoing decisions stands the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Holt v. JTM Industries, in which the court reversed a jury verdict
awarding a discharged plaintiff retaliation damages after his wife had
participated in clearly protected activities.8 In its holding, the Fifth Circuit
emphasized that the plaintiff-husband had not alleged that he participated in any
manner in his wife's activities and, as a result, to uphold the jury award would
be to confer "automatic standing" on the plaintiff.88 The Fifth Circuit then
83. See Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that
husband's claim that he was retaliated against after his wife filed an EEOC claim against
the university where they both worked was properly before court), cert. denied, 511 U.S.
1033 (1994); Thurman v. Robertshaw Control Co., 869 F. Supp. 934, 941 (N.D. Ga.
1994) ("In a case of an alleged retaliation for participation in a protected activity by a
close relative who is a co-employee, the first element of the prima facie case is modified
to require the plaintiff to show that the relative was engaged in statutorily protected
expression."); Mandia v. Arco Chem. Co., 618 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
(court impliedly accepts the possibility of third-party retaliation in holding that plaintiff
bore the burden of proof on whether he was terminated because of his wife's EEOC
charge); United States v. City of Socorro, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 815 (D.N.M.
Jan. 9, 1976) (Title VII violated when husband was threatened because his wife was
engaging in protected activities); Kombluh v. Steams & Foster Co., 73 F.R.D. 307 (S.D.
Ohio 1976) (plaintiff entitled to trial on issue of retaliatory discharge because of his
wife's lawful engagement in picketing employer).
84. EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 1993).
85. Id. at 544.
86. Id. at 545.
87. Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1821 (1997).
88. Id.
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weighed the equitable considerations of allowing reprisals against third parties
against the anti-retaliation provision's literal language, graciously allowing that
to permit the husband's judgment to stand "might eliminate the risk that an
employer will retaliate against an employee for their spouse's protected
activities."89 However, the court concluded that such a rule would contradict the
plain language of the statute.
By emphasizing the fact that the plaintiff had not participated whatsoever
in his wife's protected conduct, and that the court's decision was, therefore,
simply a rejection of "automatic standing," the Fifth Circuit in Holt was able to
avoid the clearly distasteful holding that employers could retaliate with
unfettered abandon against third parties for their relatives' protected conduct.
Likewise, by anchoring its decision in Ohio Edison on the fact that the person
who actually engaged in the protected activity did so as the plaintiff's express
"representative," the Sixth Circuit also was able to avoid the arguably liberal
holding that any and all third parties could invoke the anti-retaliation provision
based on a closely related employee's protected activity.90
Taken together, Holt and Edison are more restrictive than De Medina and
its progeny in that Holt and Edison require that an employee somehow involve
herself in a third party's protected conduct before claiming the opposition as her
own, while those courts employing De Medina concentrate on an employer's
retaliatory animus, without overly concerning themselves with the plaintiff's
statutory standing. Regardless of the arguably more equitable outcome under De
Medina, the plain language of the statutes is clearly on the side of a more
restrictive reading in this area, as opposed, for instance, to the more restrictive
readings of the meaning of "adverse action" in the following Part of this
Article.9
IV. ADVERSE ACTION
Once a plaintiff establishes that she has engaged in protected activity, courts
must then determine whether the employer's conduct constitutes "retaliation."
Importantly, both Title VII and the ADEA contain no language regarding the
type of employer conduct that will trigger a retaliation claim. The anti-
retaliation provisions speak only in terms of "discrimination" in that it is "an
89. Id. The Holt court distinguished its holding from that ofDe Medina by writing
that it was unclear in De Medina whether the plaintiff had participated in any manner in
her husband's activities, whereas in the case before it, the plaintiff had simply not
participated in his wife's activities and could not be granted "automatic standing." Id.
90. EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541,546 (6th Cir. 1993). Indeed the Sixth
Circuit even recognized the slippery slope inherent in such a holding when it warned
against such a broad reading of Title VII that "any time that an adverse employment
action is taken by an employer against an employee at the same time a second employee
is engaging in protected activity, the first employee could allege retaliation." Id. at 546.
91. See infra Section IV,
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unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants"'92 because of their participation or opposition activities.
Hence, the plain language of these two Acts, unlike the language of the ADA,93
gives little guidance as to what constitutes prohibited retaliation.
A. Retaliatory Conduct
Courts generally agree that employment decisions involving hiring, granting
leave, discharge, promotion, and compensation suffice as discrimination.94 But
aside from these more obvious acts of retaliation, courts differ markedly in their
treatment of less obvious retaliatory employer conduct, so much so that a clear
split has arisen among the circuits on the issue. As a result, whether legally
actionable retaliation has occurred in a given case will depend largely on the
jurisdiction in which the litigants find themselves.95
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994) (emphasis added).
93. The ADA's anti-retaliation clause contains participation and opposition clauses
like those found in Title VII and the ADEA, but it also includes a separate section:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having
exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged
any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or
protected by this Act.
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (1994).
Thus, not only is the employer prohibited from "discriminating," it may not
"coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere" with one who has engaged in protected
activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (1994). Arguably, this language broadens the scope of
prohibited employer actions. Certainly, those Title VII decisions mandating that an
"ultimate employment action" exist before finding actionable retaliation should not
provide precedent for a narrow interpretation of the ADA's anti-retaliation clause.
No reported case, however, appears to contrast the language of the various anti-
retaliation provisions; in fact, no ADA decision appears to actually analyze the
distinctive ADA language apart from the language of Title VII and the ADEA. However,
without discussing the ADA's actual language, one district court opinion has recognized
that harassment may constitute retaliation under the ADA. See Muller v. Costello, No.
94-CV-842, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5239, at *20 (N.D.N.Y., Apr. 16, 1996). The EEOC
regulations implementing the ADA's anti-retaliation provision merely restate the
statutory language and, hence, provide no interpretative guidance either. 29 C.F.R. §§
1630.2 (a), (b) (1995).
As a result, proponents of the narrow construction of the anti-retaliation clauses in
Title VII and the ADEA could argue that the omission of the additional language in those
acts supports their restrictive interpretations of what constitutes retaliation under those
two statutes. However, for an opposing view, see infra Section V of this Article.
94. See, e.g., Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1980); Whatley v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 632 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1980).
95. See Nelson v. University of Maine Sys., 923 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Me. 1996)
("Divergent authority, nationwide, obscures the parameters of adverse employment
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Some courts have adopted an extremely narrow view of actionable
retaliation, holding that the retaliation must involve a "material" or "ultimate"
employment decision.96 In these jurisdictions, conduct which falls short of such
characterization renders the plaintiff's prima faie case legally inadequate, and
as a result, wide open to a summary judgment motion by the defendant. A
second set of courts requires that the adverse conduct be related to the
employment and have more than a trivial or insignificant effect on the
employment relationship.97 Yet a third set of courts emphasizes that retaliation
can come in "many shapes and sizes"; these courts allow for a wide range of
actions constituting retaliation, at least for the purposes of surviving the
employer's motion for summary judgment.98
1. The Narrow View: Ultimate Employment Decision
Courts that narrowly construe the anti-retaliation clause appear to be
concerned that a broad interpretation of the clause may hinder the ability of
employers to manage their employees,99 a concern that is not without merit. An
employee who has engaged in protected activity should not be able to wield her
protected status as a hammer against any and all adverse events that might affect
her at the workplace."° Injurisdictions with liberal readings of "adverse action,"
it is undoubtable that many employers feel hamstrung to take any legitimate
action against such an employee for fear of triggering a retaliation charge; in
these more liberal circuits, employers may very well feel that a "protected"
employee is truly "untouchable." In seeming response to these employer
concerns, several courts have developed a simple, predictable, bright-line
rule-adverse actions must be "ultimate employment decisions," such as hiring
and firing, in order to withstand summary judgment.
action.").
96. See, e.g., Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 336 (1997).
97. See, e.g., Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1995).
98. See, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).
99. See, e.g., Nelson v. Univ. of Maine Sys., 923 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Me. 1996)
("This Court is weary of defining an adverse employment action in a manner which
discourages open communication, critical or otherwise, between employers or
supervisors and their employees as to the employee's employment performance.").
Despite its concerns, however, the Nelson court recognized that "within reasonable
limits, in order to arrive at a determination as to adverse employment action, a case by
case review is necessary." Id. at 282.
100. Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Not
everything that makes an employee unhappy qualifies as retaliation, for otherwise, minor
and even trivial employment actions that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did
not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.").
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For example, in Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., °1 the Fifth Circuit reversed
a jury verdict finding that an employer had retaliated against the plaintiff in
return for her filing of a sexual harassment claim. 2 At trial, the employee in
Mattern alleged that: (1) her fellow employees had been notably hostile toward
her; (2) her tools had been stolen at her worksite; (3) her supervisors made an
unprecedented visit to her home to check on the validity of her illness after she
called in sick; and (4) she missed a chance for a pay increase and was placed on
"final warning."' 3 Despite affirmative jury findings on these incidents, the Fifth
Circuit held that, as a matter of law, such actions by the employer did not violate
the retaliation clause because they did not constitute an "ultimate employment
action."
Instead of concentrating on what legally constituted "discrimination" in
return for protected activity under Title VII, the court in Mattern, like most other
courts, focused solely on whether an "adverse employment action" existed. In
underlining its "ultimate employment decision" rule, the court emphasized that
Title VII was not designed to either "address every decision made by employers
that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions"
or "an interlocutory or mediate decision which can lead to an ultimate
decision."" Defending its holding, the Mattern court reasoned: "To hold
otherwise would be to expand the definition of 'adverse employment action' to
include events such as disciplinary filings, supervisor's reprimands, and even
poor performance by the employee-anything which might jeopardize
employment in the future. Such expansion is unwarranted."'"°
The Fifth Circuit in Mattern, and numerous district courts employing the
strict ultimate employment decision standard," have relied expressly on the
101. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 336 (1997).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 707-08.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 708 (emphasis in original).
106. Williams v. Encompass, No. 96-8574, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3041, at *4
(E.D.N.C. June 20, 1997) (threat of firing and refusal to give plaintiff tools necessary to
do job are not adverse employment actions); Sharp v. City of Houston, 960 F. Supp.
1164, 1172 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (shunning by colleagues, exclusion from morning roll call,
tampering with saddle, inassistance after auto accident, and holding banquet to honor
alleged sexual harassers, are not adverse employment actions); Keegan v. Dalton, 899
F. Supp. 1503, 1511 (E.D. Va. 1995) (supervisors attempts to erect "minor hindrances"
to accomplishment of plaintiff's tasks are not adverse employment actions); Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 829, 836 (D. Md. 1994) (warning placed
in plaintiff's file, and requirement that plaintiff perform strenuous physical activities not
adverse actions), af'd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996); Ward
v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367, 377 (D. Md. 1994) ("not speaking to
[employee] and giving her less favorable assignments in the 'dirtier' part of the
basement" are adverse employment actions).
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Fourth Circuit's decision in Page v. Bolger '07 as the genesis of their holdings.
However, these courts' exclusive reliance on Page is misplaced, most
fundamentally so because Page simply did not concern an anti-retaliation clause.
Rather, Page addressed a plaintiff's attempt to rewrite the prima facie case
requirements in a failure-to-promote case brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
16(a), a particular section of Title VII which deals only with discrimination in
federal employment and which itself requires that there be a "personnel action,"
not merely "discrimination." '
In Page, an African-American male alleged that the racial composition of
a review panel that recommended individuals for promotion qualified as
discrimination in a personnel action under Section 2000e-16(a). The Fourth
Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the plaintiff had to assert a claim regarding the
panel's actual decision rather than challenge the composition of the panel
itself."° The court held that steps in the process toward a final decision are
merely mediate decisions that do not provide a basis for liability. Thus, there
was no personnel action at issue in Page to trigger the coverage of the statute.' 0
In determining the scope of "personnel action," the court looked to other
"comparable provisions of Title VII, most notably... 42 U.S.C .§ 2000e-2(a)
(1)," the basic anti-discrimination provision of Title VII."'
Both Title VII provisions cited in Page are "substantive" discrimination
sections, not anti-retaliation sections; the latter being so far removed from the
concerns of actual substantive discrimination that they protect plaintiffs even
when the underlying discrimination claims are unsuccessful." 2 Moreover, even
if the statutory term at issue in Page actually did concern retaliation, the
language in the anti-retaliation provisions is arguably broader with regard to
employer conduct in that it prohibits any discrimination as opposed to merely
personnel actions. Nonetheless, Page constantly is cited by courts employing
a conservative adverse action standard. Despite these courts' flawed reliance on
Page as precedent and their failure to engage in statutory construction, courts
continue to employ the Page language as a mechanistic, determinative standard,
especially in the wake of Mattern's affirmative reliance on Page. For instance,
in one recent district court case, a plaintiff alleged that her employer retaliated
against her by threatening to discharge her, intimidating her, interfering with her
management tasks, and ultimately reassigning her from her original office to
107. 645 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
108. Id. at 232. For a detailed criticism of Mattern's reliance on Page, see
Deavenport v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., No. 96-13-002, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS,
12342, at "11-19 (D. Colo. Aug. 13, 1997).
109. Page, 645 F.2d at 233.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 33.
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another office for ninety days of training."' Citing Mattern, the district court
stated that the employer's threats of removal were "not adverse employment
actions because of their lack of consequence..... 4
Other examples of non-actionable employer conduct under the ultimate
employment decision standard include: (1) a plaintiff being followed by
supervisor while off the job;".. (2) an employer threatening to discharge a
protected employee and refusing to give the employee the tools necessary to
complete her job; (3) an employer excluding an employee from the morning roll
call, tampering with the employee's saddle, and holding a banquet to honor the
alleged sexual harassers of the employee; and (4) a supervisor's refusal to speak
to an employee, coupled with giving the employee the least favorable
assignments in the "'dirtier' part of the basement."
'
"
6
2. The Middle-of-the-Road Approach: Requiring Adverse Impact
on Plaintiff's Employment Relationship
In a second category of cases involving adverse action, courts predicate the
existence of adverse action on conduct that is detrimental to the plaintiff's
employment opportunities, either at a current or future job."7 For example, in
Nelson v. Upsala College, the Third Circuit stated that although "the connection
with employment need not necessarily be direct, it does not further the purpose
of Title VII to apply Section 704 to conduct unrelated to an employment
relationship."".. The court further wrote that "cases dealing with unlawful
retaliation under Title VII typically involve circumstances in which the
defendant's conduct has impaired or might impair the plaintiff in employment
situations.""' 9
In Nelson, the plaintiff's former employer barred the plaintiff from coming
onto the employer's campus. The court held that such action "had no impact on
any employment relationship that [plaintiff] had, or might have in the future."'20
On the other hand, the court gave several examples of conduct which would
affect a plaintiff's employment opportunities, including: (1) deletion of positive
113. Seely v. Runyon, No. 2:95-CV-279W, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7836 (D. Utah
May 28, 1997).
114. Id. at *12. In particular, the court held that the ninety-day training
reassignment did not constitute adverse employment action in that, as in other cases
involving lateral transfers, it was nothing more than a "mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities." Id. at *15 (citing Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994)).
115. Watts v. Kroger Co., 955 F. Supp. 674 n.25 (N.D. Miss. 1997).
116. See supra note 105.
117. Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1995).
118. Id. at 387.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 389.
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references from plaintiffs personnel file after an EEOC charge was filed; (2)
giving a negative reference for a former employee who had filed an EEOC
charge; (3) discontinuance of severance benefits after an EEOC charge was filed;
and (4) refusing to issue a letter of recommendation and making untrue remarks
about plaintiff to a prospective employer.12 1
- Nonetheless, the court in Nelson appeared to acknowledge the shortcomings
under Title VII of its employment relationship standard when it wrote:
[I]f an employer physically assaults a former employee or bums down her
house in retaliation for the employee having brought a Title VII charge, relief
might not be available under section 704. However, in such cases the former
employee could assert a state-law damage claim.'2
Thus, courts utilizing the employment relationship standard first focus on
whether there is a sufficient nexus between an employer's action and the
plaintiffs employment opportunities, either current or future. The courts'
analyses then turn to the severity of the employer's conduct, for just as in the
"ultimate employment decision" cases, an employer's conduct may not be
sufficiently "adverse" to constitute actionable retaliation.
For example, the Second Circuit recently held that to bar a terminated
employee from using an office and phone to conduct a job hunt presented only
a minor, ministerial stumbling block toward securing future employment, and,
thus, did not constitute adverse employment action." Likewise, the Third
Circuit held that "unsubstantiated oral reprimands" and "unnecessary derogatory
comments" did not rise to the level of the adverse action required for a retaliation
claim.124 Additionally, in a recent Eighth Circuit decision, the court held that
requiring an employee to move to a different city did not rise to the level of an
adverse employment action since the move entailed no change in position, title,
or salary. 25 The Eighth Circuit reiterated that "not everything that makes an
employee unhappy is actionable adverse action.'' 126
121. Id. (citing Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1054 (2d Cir.
1978)). Although the court in Nelson did not reference any retaliatory conduct in the
context of an ongoing employment relationship, the nature of the actions the court
considered to be post-employment adverse actions are easily analogous to the context of
present, ongoing employment. Id.
122. Nelson, 51 F.3d at 388.
123. Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1997).
124. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1301 (3d Cir. 1997).
125. Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997).
126. Id.
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3. The Broad View: A Case-by-Case Analysis
In contrast to the foregoing approaches to the meaning of "adverse
employment action," other courts addressing the issue of retaliation have
identified a broader range of acts as adverse, based on the scope of the actions'
consequences. For instance, in Collins v. Illinois, the Seventh Circuit held that
an employer retaliated against an employee when it transferred the employee to
a lateral position where: (1) her supervisors were unsure of her new
responsibilities; (2) she was largely relegated to reference work rather than
consulting work; and (3) she had lost her office and telephone."7 The move did
not involve any reduction in pay or benefits, which would almost certainly have
been determinative under the ultimate employment decision standard, but the
Seventh Circuit nonetheless held that the transfer was retaliatory.' Other
examples of retaliatory conduct which would have fallen short of the ultimate
employment decision standard but which nonetheless have been successful in
other, more liberal jurisdictions include: reduction in duties,' isolation at the
workplace, 3 ' cancellation of a major public symposium in an employee's
honor,131 and efforts to scuttle a former employee's search for ajob. 32
Addressing the perceived need for a broad definition of "adverse action,"
the District of Columbia Circuit Court has written, "The statute itself proscribes
'discriminat[ion]' against those who invoke the Act's protections; the statute
does not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take the form of cognizable
employment actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion."'33
Finally, in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the retaliation against
her took the form of co-worker harassment that her employer ignored, the
Seventh Circuit, in perhaps the most assertive declaration in support of a broad
127. 830 F.2d 692, 702-04 (7th Cir. 1987).
128. However, the Seventh Circuit cautioned in a later case that a bruised ego or
personal humiliation is insufficient to establish a "materially adverse employment action'
where the transfer involved a change only in the reporting relationship of plaintiff to his
supervisor. See Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451,457 (7th Cir. 1994).
129. Welsh v. Derwinski, 14 F.3d 85, 86 (1st Cir. 1994). The Welsh Court noted
that, while "not every unpleasant matter short of [discharge, demotion, or failure to
promote] creates a cause of action, . . . many things, such as constant rudeness,
conspicuous discriminatory acts, etc., could have an adverse effect upon employment.
Within reasonable limits, in order to arrive at a determination, a case by case review is
necessary." Id. See also Dahm v. Flynn, 60 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir. 1994) (dramatic
downward shift in skill level required to perform job responsibilities can constitute
adverse action).
130. Dortz v. City of New York, 904 F. Supp.,127, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
131. Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
132. Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (10th
Cir. 1977).
133. Passer, 935 F.2d at 331.
1998]
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interpretation of "adverse action," wrote that the employer "[sat] on its hands in
the face of the campaign of co-worker harassment" and that:
34
[t]here is nothing in the law of retaliation that restricts the type of retaliatory
act that might be visited upon an employee who seeks to invoke her rights by
filing a complaint. It need only be an adverse employment action, as we have
often held... adverse actions can take many shapes and sizes .... No one
would question the retaliatory effect of many actions that put the complainant
in a more unfiendly working environment; actions like moving the person
from a spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy closet, depriving the person of
previously available support services (like secretarial help or a desktop
computer), or cutting off challenging assignments .... The law deliberately
does not take a "laundry list" approach to retaliation, because unfortunately
its forms are as varied as the human imagination will permit.35
B. Analogy to Title Vii's Substantive
Anti-Discrimination Provision
Courts employing more restrictive readings of retaliation have turned to the
substantive anti-discrimination provision in Title VII in defense of their position,
although the wording of that section is far more detailed than that of the anti-
retaliation clause.' Under Title VII it is illegal for the employer to:
(1).. .fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges or employment because of such individual's
race, color sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee... ."'
The numerous verbs in this section of the statute contrast with the perhaps
intentionally vague language of the anti-retaliation clauses, which merely state,
without limitation, that it is "an unlawful employment action" to
"discriminate. ' Thus, the anti-retaliation provision, which is not limited to a
134. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1335 (7th Cir. 1996).
135. Id. at 1334.
136. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Courts
have operationalized the principle that retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible
enough to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions or privileges or
employment into the doctrinal requirement that the alleged retaliation constitute 'adverse
employment action."').
137. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1994) (emphasis added).
138. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3 (1994) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1994) (ADEA).
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specific definition, as is the substantive discrimination provision, may be
construed more broadly than the substantive anti-discrimination provisions.
However, the Fifth Circuit's ultimate employment decision standard appears to
contradict even the plain language of the substantive anti-discrimination clause.
Under the statute, discrimination in the "terms and conditions" of employment
is as actionable as the easily identifiable actions of hiring and firing.139
For example, hostile work environment harassment claims affect the terms
and conditions of employment and are actionable. 40 A work environment may
be discriminatory by being merely "discriminatorily hostile" or "abusive." The
U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that Title VII is violated when a
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that
is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment...... Thus, in
substantive discrimination cases, neither economic harm nor psychological
injury are necessary;' generally, the standard for imposition of employer
liability for a hostile work environment is a "knew or should have known"
standard, under which an employer is liable if it failed to implement prompt and
appropriate corrective action."
Similarly, in many retaliation cases, the conduct at issue may involve
harassment by co-workers who resent the protected activity of the plaintiff.
Often, the employer may be aware of this conduct. Corresponding to the
definition of discrimination in some circuits, such co-employee harassment may
qualify as "adverse employment action." 1" For instance, the Seventh Circuit
noted in Knox v. Indiana that "there is nothing to indicate that the principle of
139. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) ("the phrase 'terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment ... in employment."). Importantly, the Harris
court recognized that determining whether conduct constituted actionable harassment was
"not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test." Id. at 22. Determining
whether employer conduct constitutes actionable retaliation may pose analytically similar
problems for the Supreme Court if it ever considers the matter.
140. Id. at 21-22.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 21.
143. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). However, even this substantive area reflects uncertainty,
as the Supreme Court will decide when an employer is liable for hostile work
environment sexual harassment committed by a supervisor as opposed to co-workers.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (1 th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct.
438 (1997).
144. Of course, not all hostile work environment cases are sufficiently severe or
abusive to be actionable. Likewise, one could argue that not all retaliatory conduct is
sufficiently severe to be actionable. However, such an argument in no way mandates the
use of a constricted "ultimate employment decision" definition of actionable retaliation.
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employer responsibility does not extend equally to other Title VII claims, such
as a claim of unlawful retaliation."'
' 45
Nonetheless, courts imposing a narrow reading on the anti-retaliation clause
are quick to characterize such harassment as "predictable tension that arises in
an office."'" For example, in Swain v. Roadway Express, Inc., a plaintiff alleged
that co-workers retaliated against her by driving their cars extremely close to her
as if to run the plaintiff over, ostracizing her, and allegedly assaulting her.
47
After citing the Page ultimate employment decision standard, the court held that
"these alleged actions, while serious and quite possibly illegal do not constitute
adverse employment actions as a matter of law. ' 1
41
Aside from their misplaced reliance on Page v. Bolger, courts accepting the
ultimate employment decision standard essentially adopt mutually contradictory
positions in treating retaliation claims. On one hand, these courts' limited
definition of adverse action renders a retaliation claim far more limited than an
underlying discrimination claim. On the other hand, all courts, including
"ultimate employment decision" courts, recognize that a retaliation claim may
exist even when no actual discrimination has occurred, implying that retaliation
claims, by their very nature, have broader objectives than discrimination claims.
V. CAUSATION
Because there are two independent showings of causation under the
McDonnell Douglas scheme, 149 there are two-times as many pitfalls for the
unwary employee in asserting the third prima facie element of a retaliation
case.'5 In the employee's initial complaint, before the employer has proffered
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action, the employee has
a minimal burden; courts have variously held that a plaintiff need only allege
evidence "sufficient to raise the inference that her protected activity was the
likely reason for the adverse action" and that a plaintiff "merely.., establish that
the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated."'' Even
145. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996). The EEOC agrees that
retaliatory harassment, whether perpetrated by supervisors or co-workers, is actionable.
See EEOC Compliance Manual, § 614.7(c) (Jan. 1988), available in LEXIS,
Employment Library, Eeoman File.
146. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 836 (D. Md. 1994),
af'd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
147. Swain v. Roadway Express, Inc., No. HAR 96-279, 1996 WL 281564 (D. Md.
May 13, 1996).
148. Id. at *5.
149. See supra Section II.A.
150. The "causation must be proved in its own right" and its "existence cannot be
bootstrapped from the existence of the other two elements." Hamann v. Gates Chevrolet,
Inc., 910 F.2d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir. 1990).
151. Zanders v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1135 (6th Cir.
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the Fifth Circuit, while refusing to adopt the "wholly unrelated" test for this
initial causation showing, has conceded that a plaintiff still need not prove that
her protected activity was the "sole factor" motivating an adverse action. 5 2
A. Causal Inferences
In evaluating this first causal showing of retaliation, courts regularly allow
for mere allegations of close temporal proximity between a plaintiff's protected
conduct and the alleged adverse action to give rise to an inference of
causation.1 3 Time periods of one day, one week, two weeks, and even up to
fifteen months have been held sufficient to infer causation and thereby put the
defendant to his burden to respond."4 In computing the time between protected
conduct and adverse action, a court should not concentrate solely on the first
instance of protected action since a later re-urging of a complaint may shorten
the temporal period. ' However, regardless of close temporal proximity, no
causal link may exist if the employee does not allege that her employer was
aware of her protected activity. 5 6 And, where time periods of one year, and even
1990); Simmons v. Camden County Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (1 lth Cir. 1985);
Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982).
152. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996).
153. Regarding the initial showing of causality under a Title VII or ADEA claim,
the plaintiff need only show "actions taken by [his] employer from which one can infer,
if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were
based on a [retaliatory] criterion illegal under [Title VII]." Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). A showing that the parties' actions are sequential,
with alleged retaliatory adverse actions following protected activities, may establish a
prima facie element of causality. Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th
Cir. 1989); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1141 n.13
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
154. Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 939 (7th Cir. 1996). The
Johnson Court allowed for a causal inference, arising from the plaintiff's allegations of
his employer having denied him higher vacation pay and use of a company vehicle,
because the denials occurred two weeks after the plaintiff filed his EEOC complaint. Id.
(citing Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1315 (7th Cir. 1989)
(finding that a one week period between a complaint and an adverse employment
decision was sufficient to create a factual issue on the question of causation)). See also
Harrison v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 80 F.3d 1107, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996);
Johnson v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1991).
155. Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997). In
Kachmar, the Third Circuit ruled that an employee's initial consultations with his
superiors were not the only protected activity the employee engaged in; rather, the district
court failed to take into account later legal "counsel[ing]" of the employee's superiors
regarding the implications of the same disparate treatment of which the employee had
initially complained. Id.
156. Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1458 (7th Cir. 1994).
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up to ten years have passed between protected activity and adverse action, courts
have held, not surprisingly, that there may be no inference of causation based
solely on such extended periods.'57
When there is a lack of temporal proximity between the protected activity
and the adverse action sufficient to raise an inference of causality, the Third
Circuit has held that a "pattern of antagonism" following the protected conduct
also can give rise to the inference.158 Moreover, these two manners, temporal
proximity and a pattern of antagonism, are still "not the exclusive ways to show
causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise
the inference."' 59 In examining the whole of the plaintiff's complaint, the court
should make a "more generalized inquiry" into whether the protected activity
was the "likely reason" for the plaintiff's dismissal."6 Nonetheless, where the
157. Chavez v. City of Arvada, 88 F.3d 861, 866 (10th Cir. 1996). The Chavez
court held that the ten-year period between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action did not permit an inference of causation in retaliation case unless
there were sufficient evidence tying the adverse employment action to the past protected
activity. One ambiguous, disputed statement in the interim was not such "sufficient
evidence." Id.
158. Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 177 (citing Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
982 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1993)). Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit appears to have ruled
that no causal inference is possible at all if there is no temporal proximity between the
protected conduct and the adverse employment action. Candelaria v. EG & G Energy
Measurements, Inc., 33 F.3d 1259, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 1994); Burrus v. United Tel. Co.,
Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982). However, in
each of these cases, a significant amount of time had passed between the protected
conduct and the adverse action. Candelaria, 33 F.3d at 1259; Burrus, 683 F.2d at 343.
Therefore, it is questionable whether the Tenth Circuit would reach the same outcome
as it did in Bihrrus and Candelaria, if it were faced with a case in which there was only
a reasonable amount of time coupled with, for instance, an ongoing pattern of
antagonism.
159. Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 177. Another consideration "in the whole" of the
plaintiff's complaint is an employer's inconsistency in following its normal procedures
with regard to the plaintiff and a series of facially neutral incidents that, when taken as
a whole, were too coincidental to be explained as normal procedure. Gemmell v. Meese,
655 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Sims v. MME Paulette Dry Cleaners, 580 F.
Supp. 593, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
160. Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 179. In a 1996 opinion, however, the Fifth Circuit
demonstrated to what extreme lengths a court could go in agonizing over the question of
causation. In Long v. Eastfield College, two employees brought suit for retaliatory
discharge after their respective supervisors, both of whom harbored allegedly retaliatory
motives, recommended that the plaintiffs be terminated. 88 F.3d 300, 305-06 (5th Cir.
1996). The court first distinguished between: (1) adverse employment actions carried out
by an "ordinary employee," which were generally not causally related to the plaintiffs'
employer, and (2) adverse employment actions carried out by a "supervisory employee"
with the "authority to make the decisions to discipline, hire, and fire subordinate
employees," which were causally related to the plaintiffs' employer. Id. at 305-07.
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only evidence of a causal connection between protected conduct and adverse
action was that it was "the only plausible reason," the Eighth Circuit has ruled
that there is "not, without more, sufficient [evidence] to support [a] retaliation
claim.' 6' And, where an employee willfully resigns after filing only a single
complaint and the employer goes so far as to ask the employee to withdraw his
resignation, there is no inference of causation. 62
B. Rebutting Causation-Legitimate Reasons and Lack of Intent
1. Legitimate Reasons
As applied to the anti-retaliation provisions, the McDonnell Douglas
scheme requires that an employer rebut an employee's first showing of causation
with a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, a burden which the
Eleventh Circuit has called "exceedingly light."'6 Often, employers satisfy this
burden by simply alleging poor business and economic prospects as a legitimate
reason for discharge."6 Employers also may claim dissatisfaction with the
employee's performance and buttress this claim with some sort of
documentation. Examples of such documentation may be poor job performance
reviews, student evaluations of a teacher, and budgets showing a lack of need for
an employee's employment position in the future.1
65
In the first category-adverse action by an ordinary employee-the appellate court
purported to include co-employees whose allegedly discriminatory actions could not be
imputed to the employer. Id. at 306. In treating this issue, however, the court thoroughly
muddled the distinct issues of: (1) co-employee discrimination-that a plaintiff opposes
but which is not imputable to an employer, and (2) any eventual, adverse action that the
employer takes against the plaintiff in return for her opposition to her co-employee's
conduct.
To complicate matters further, the two supervisors in Long did not make the
ultimate decision on adverse action against the plaintiffs, though they did recommend
that the employees be discharged. Id. This, in turn, sent the court spiraling downward
into a belabored study of whether the two supervisors' superior conducted his own
investigation, in which case there was no prima facie showing of a causal relation, or
whether the superior merely "rubber stamped" the recommendations of the plaintiffs' two
supervisors, in which case the plaintiffs had met the prima facie element of causation.
Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that there was a prima facie showing of causation.
Id.
161. Evans v. Pugh, 902 F.2d 689, 693 (8th Cir. 1990).
162. Frost v. Chromalloy Aerospace Tech. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 82, 87 (D. Conn.
1988).
163. Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing
Tipton v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 872 F.2d 1491, 1495 (1 1th Cir. 1989)).
164. Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 (1st Cir. 1996).
165. Johnson v. University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 70 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir.
1995); West v. Fred Wright Constr. Co., 756 F.2d 31, 33 (6th Cir. 1985). Of course, oral
1998]
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Nonetheless, when negative job performance reviews occur during the
pendency of an employee's underlying discrimination suit, such documentation
may not be sufficient to overcome the employee's inference of causation. 66
And, in the event that documentation generated after an employee engages in
protected action may establish a legitimate reason for adverse action, the
employee may nonetheless rebut the employer's explanation with proof that such
documentation was pretextual.
67
Employers also have argued that the manner in which an employee engages
in her protected conduct may itself provide the employer with a legitimate reason
for adverse action. In response to an employer's claim that it legitimately
discharged an employee because the employee engaged in "disloyalty" by
informing one of the employer's customers that the employer was racist, the
Ninth Circuit has held that disloyalty alone did not provide a nondiscriminatory
reason for adverse action. 6' However, an employer may instead assert that its
adverse action was legitimate because it was taken in response to an employee's
"serious breach of trust," a standard which the Ninth Circuit itself enunciated in
a participation clause case.
69
Finally, an employer may assert that even an employee's seemingly
protected actions under the participation clause or the opposition clause have
become so unreasonable as to significantly disrupt the workplace or directly
hinder the employee's job performance. 7 For example, when an employee fails
to complete her work because she has spent up to a third of her work time
gathering information to support her EEOC claim, an employer may have a
nondiscriminatory reason for adverse action despite the employee's participation
in her claim.' Likewise, when an employee opposes alleged discrimination by
testimony regarding employer dissatisfaction may also suffice. For example, even when
a company official admits having been upset by an employee's filing of a complaint, his
testimony that he did not believe the employee had the necessary experience to warrant
a promotion was not pretextual. Dominguez v. Nelson, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
74, 76 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 1986).
166. Lewis v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 691 F. Supp. 915, 922 (D. Md. 1988). But see
Kolpas v. G.D. Searle & Co., 959 F. Supp. 525, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (employee's failure
to comply with company policy by providing a medical release to return to work after her
debilitating injury was a legitimate reason for dismissal under the ADA's anti-retaliation
provision).
167. See supra note 121.
168. EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1983).
169. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir.
1996). This is, of course, in addition to characterizing the employee's conduct as simply
not protected conduct, so that the plaintiff's prima facie case fails. See supra note 43.
170. Crown, 720 F.2d at 1014.
171. Hernandez v. Alexander, 607 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Willis
v. Conoco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 286 (1lth Cir. 1997) (defendant had legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason under ADA to terminate plaintiff's employment when plaintiff
who claimed disability refused to return to work after doctor proclaimed the plaintiff
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complaining to her co-employees to such an extent as to significantly disrupt the
co-employees' work, she may provide the employer with a legitimate, articulable
reason for adverse action. 72 Again, however, activity that an employer claims
is disruptive may be characterized by a plaintiff as mere participation "in any
manner" in a discrimination complaint. 73
2. Lack of Intent
There is no explicitly articulated affirmative defense available to an
employer in a retaliation claim under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA.
Moreover, some courts have refused to create a judicial defense based on an
adverse action that an employer admits it took because of an employee's
protected conduct but that the employer contends was not done with a retaliatory
motive. For example, in EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and
Universities,17 an employer denied internal arbitration procedures to any
employee who filed a concurrent action with the EEOC so as to avoid
duplicative investigations. The Seventh Circuit wrote that "[n]othing in [the
ADEA anti-retaliation provision] requires a showing of intent" because the anti-
retaliation provision is "concerned with the effect of discrimination against
employees who pursue their federal rights, not the motivation of the employer
who discriminates."'75
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has accepted an employer's defense to
a Title VII claim when the employer lacked a retaliatory motive and supported
its adverse action with a legitimate business concern. In EEOC v. J.M. Huber
Corp., in which an employer claimed that it withheld retirement benefits from
an employee in order to ensure the tax-qualified status of the company's benefit
plan under ERISA, the Fifth Circuit examined the employer's motive by
focusing on whether the alleged retaliation had a disparate impact on only
employees who engaged in protected activity." The circuit court's finding that
there was no such impact may have created what one commentator terms "an
affirmative defense to a policy that on its face allegedly violated the retaliation
provision of Title VII.,,'177 However, the Huber holding also may be seen as an
capable to return to work).
172. Hochstadt v. Worcester Found., 545 F.2d 222, 229 (1st Cir. 1976).. See also
Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278 (1 lth Cir. 1997)
(under ADA, defendant had a legitimate reason for terminating disabled plaintiff who,
in opposing alleged lack of necessary lunch breaks, circulated insulting petitions in her
workplace. and threatened to "disembowel" her "petty tyrant" employers).
173. Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1569 (2d Cir. 1989).
174. EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Univs., 957 F.2d 424, 427
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 906 (1992).
175. Id.
176. EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 942 F.2d 930, 931 (5th Cir. 1991).
177. Edward C. Lyons, EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and
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instance of an employer negating application of the circumstantial McDonnell
Douglas scheme when, in fact, the employer has direct evidence of its lack of
intent.
C. But For Causation-Pretext
After an employer has responded to an employee's retaliation complaint
with a legitimate explanation, the burden of production shifts back to the
employee to rebut the employer's explanation with evidence showing that, but
for her protected activity, her employer would not have carried out its adverse
action.1 78 Courts have termed the first showing of causation in a plaintiff's prima
facie case as "much less stringent" than this second "rigorous" causation
standard, which is "designed to ensure that the mere fact that an employee files
a charge against his employer will not immunize him from legitimate discipline
for an unsatisfactory performance."'79
A majority of courts has held that a mere showing that an employee's
protected conduct is "in part" the reason for an adverse action, or a "substantial
element" of the employer's decision, will not satisfy the second causal
showing. 8' Moreover, a plaintiff must show an actual, impermissible motive on
behalf of the employer; it may not be enough to prove merely that the
employer's proffered legitimate reason is false.' A showing of such
impermissible motive must be made with "specific facts" as "[i]t is not enough
for [a] plaintiff merely to cast doubt upon the employer's justification."'8
Universities: Collective-Bargaining Agreements andAge Discrimination in Employment
Act Claims: What Counts as Retaliation Under ADEA Section 4(D), 20 J.C. & U.L. 241,
251 (1993).
178. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 1985);
see also Dwyer v. Smith 867 F.2d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 1989).
179. EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 117 F.3d 1278 (6th Cir. 1997). See also
Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing McMillan v. Rust
College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1983)); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank,
698 F.2d 633, 668-69 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
180. Maness v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 7 F.3d 704, 708 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
512 U.S. 1207 (1994); Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 43 (5th Cir. 1992);
Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 1989); Jack v. Texaco Research Ctr., 743
F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1984); Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 243-
44 (4th Cir. 1982).
181. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1164 (1994). The converse of this is that the defendant/employer need
not establish that its proffered legitimate reasons were its actual motives. West v. Fred
Wright Const. Co., 756 F.2d 31, 33 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). See generally St. Mary's v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502,510-11 (1993).
182. Lawrence v. Northrop Corp., 980 F.2d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 1992).
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However, the D.C. Circuit has attempted to downplay any perceived harshness
of the second causal showing, writing that the standard
not at all precludes a finding of a Title VII violation when an employer acts
from mixed motives. The mere presence of a legitimate purpose underlying
the discharge will not sterilize unlawful retaliation, where the latter is in fact
the dispositive cause. The but for standard simply compares the adversity
faced by the plaintiff employee ... with conditions imposed on similarly
situated employees who did not engage in protected conduct.183
Those evidentiary showings that fail to rebut an employer's legitimate
reason for an adverse action will differ, of course, depending on the individual
case. Among the more noteworthy holdings are: (1) an employer's "mere
knowledge" of protected activity "is not sufficient evidence of retaliation to
counter substantial evidence of legitimate reasons for discharging that
employee;"1" (2) a supervisor's comment that "if [plaintiff] had not gone crying
to... [her] fiends... [she] would not be in the position... [she was] in," and
other similar statements that the appellate court termed "susceptible of several
interpretations, most of which are innocuous," were not enough to establish a
factual issue on the issue of but for causation; and (3) a suit filed on the heels of
an employee's protected conduct is not retaliation where the employer has a
"factual and legally well founded" basis for the suit.185
Employees have been most successful in establishing but for causation
when they suffer unprecedented reprimands or poor work evaluations after
engaging in protected activity. For instance, where a plaintiff's performance
evaluations were excellent for nine years prior to the protected conduct and the
plaintiff s supervisor became "increasingly abusive" after the protected activity,
ajury finding of but for causation has been affirmed. 186 Likewise, evidence that
an employer who discharged the plaintiff had never before discharged anyone
for the same infraction and that work evaluations were downgraded after
engaging in protected activity has created a question of fact on but for
causation. 7
183. Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
184. Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989).
.185. EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405,410 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
186. Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42-43 (5th Cir. 1994).
187. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 1996) (revising grant
of summaryjudgment for employer); Davis v. Fleming Co., 55 F.3d 1369, 1373 (8th Cir.
1995). In Davis, a question of fact existed regarding defendant's legitimate reasons
where there had never been any prior complaints about plaintiff's work, and plaintiff had
been recommended for possible promotion before engaging in his protected activity.
Davis, 55 F.3d at 1373. Conversely, where there is evidence that the plaintiff was not
treated atypically but, in fact, the defendant had a history of taking similar adverse action
against discrimination complainants, an employee may also rebut an employer's
legitimate reason. Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. 114, 131-32
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Nonetheless, the fact that an employer was dissatisfied with an employee's
performanceprior to the employee's protected conduct does not, in and of itself,
bar a finding of but for causation.' Although an empioyer has given an
employee unfavorable performance reviews before protected activity, a showing
that the employer has engaged in other retaliatory conduct since the employee's
protected activity, such as transferring the plaintiff to a new location with
unreasonable working conditions and assigning the plaintiff an overload of work
that is impossible to complete, may sustain a jury finding on the second issue of
causation." 9
D. Court Review of Causation After Trial
As a result of the different standards of proof in the two causal showings of
a retaliation case, the Sixth Circuit has held that, upon an employer's motion for
judgment notwithstanding a jury's verdict for the employee, the trial court can
review only the sufficiency of the evidence of but for causation, as opposed to
the sufficiency of evidence to establish a prima facie causal inference. 9 ° Upon
proper motion, the district court must address directly whether the plaintiff has
established evidence of the "ultimate issue" in a retaliation case-but for
causation." ' This holding is perhaps most significant in that, on appeal, the
Sixth Circuit held that an appellate court also was limited to reviewing the
ultimate, but for causation issue. 92 In sum, then, after a jury trial or, assumably,
a bench trial, the only appealable issue regarding causation would appear to be
the ultimate question of but for causation.
VI. REmE DIS
Traditionally, damages under Title VII for violations of the substantive
discrimination clauses or retaliation clause were limited to equitable relief,
including back pay and attorney's fees. 93 The ADA was similarly limited, at
(D. Minn. 1977).
188. See, e.g., Dominic v. Consol. Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1987).
189. Id. at 1254-56.
190. EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997)
("Following a trial on the merits, the district court, therefore, cannot return to a
consideration of whether plaintiff has proven its prima facie case" of retaliation.). Of
course, this is distinct from cases in which appellate courts may review prima facie
retaliation showings on matters disposed of by summary judgment or another pre-trial
manner. See, e.g., Harrison v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 80 F.3d 1107, 1119 (6th
Cir. 1996).
191. Avery, 104 F.3d at 861.
192. Id.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
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least initially.' 94 On the other hand, the ADEA always has allowed for doubling
of back pay upon a finding of "willfulness."' 195 Damages under the ADEA
remain unchanged, but the Civil Rights Act of 1991 significantly impacted
recoverable damages under Title VII and the ADA, the latter of which had not
even come into effect as to employers at the time those additional damages were
added. Importantly, employers, depending on their size, may now be liable for
compensatory and punitive damages in amounts up to $300,000.196 These
damages are available for violations of the retaliation clauses, again, even if the
underlying substantive discrimination claim has proven unsuccessful. Further,
courts interpreting the amendments have allowed plaintiffs to recover damages
for statutory emotional distress claims even though the plaintiffs suffered no
economic loss.' 97
Certainly, these new and expanded damages provide added incentive for an
affected employee to pursue her retaliation claim. Conversely, their existence
should serve as an additional incentive for employers to avoid actions that appear
to be retaliatory.
VII. EVALUATION
As they are wont to do, courts have taken what began as a straightforward,
three-element test for actionable retaliation and turned it into a labyrinth of
conflicting decisions and poorly defined required showings. And, as employees
increasingly turn to the retaliation clauses either as independent causes of action
or to buttress their discrimination claims, it is likely that the conflicts regarding
the elements of retaliation only will compound, becoming more nebulous in
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994). The ADA incorporates the same remedies
available under Title VII in this section.
195. Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994), incorporates the
remedies contained in Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216
(1994). The Supreme Court has defined "willful" conduct as the employer either
knowing or showing "reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was
prohibited by the statute." Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 617 (1993). In
order to prove "willfulness," the plaintiff need not provide "direct evidence of the
employer's motivation" nor show that the defendant employer's conduct was
"outrageous." Id. Liquidated damages are available to a non-federal discriminatee and
to the EEOC. See Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1994).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1) (1994).
197. See, e.g., Davis v. New York City Dept. of Mental Health, No. 88 Civ. 8999,
1995 WL 580892 (S.D.N.Y. March 24, 1995) (plaintiff belittled during staff meetings,
was given little work to do and was otherwise harassed). Importantly, Davis indicates
that emotional distress claims under Title VII may be defined more broadly than common
law state tort actions, which generally require "extreme and outrageous" conduct by the
employer. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 46 (1965). See generally
Douglas E. Ray, Title VII Retaliation Cases: Creating a New Protected Class, 58 U.
PITr. L. REv. 405,431 (1997).
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certain areas while more sharply defined in others. Nevertheless, at least two of
the currently conflicting lines of decisions must be reconciled at some point lest
the nation become a checkerboard of alternately employee- or employer-friendly
jurisdictions.
A. Adverse Employment Action
The most pressing issue is the question of what constitutes "adverse
employment action." Given (1) the complete absence of any language in Title
VII and the ADEA that would restrict retaliation to ultimate employment
decisions, and (2) certain courts' flimsy resort to the inapposite decision of Page
v. Bolger, the position taken by those courts imposing a restrictive standard on
the meaning of "adverse action" seems to be the least tenable. Such restrictive
standards simply do not reflect a reading of the employment statutes in their
"broader context" so as not to "undermine [their] effectiveness," a judicial goal
that the current Supreme Court in Robinson expressly held was necessary in
interpreting the statutes. 9 '
Additionally, the fact that the ADA explicitly allows for retaliation in the
form of mere coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference should serve to
clarify the meaning of retaliation under the ADA's predecessors. The fact that
such definitive language was excluded from Title VII and the ADEA should not
be considered representative of Congress' intent regarding the prior statutes
because the distasteful but inescapable conclusion would be that Congress
somehow intended to provide disabled victims of discrimination greater
protection from workplace retaliation than victims of racial or sexual
discrimination.
Despite the "ultimate employment decision" courts' zeal to protect
employers from being unduly restricted in disciplining their employees, the
courts' harsh, unyielding standard practically encourages employers to retaliate
against protected employees in numerous intangible manners which, in their
totality, may in fact be as tangible, if not more so, than any ultimate employment
decision. It is exactly such "perverse [employer] incentives" that the Supreme
Court in Robinson explicitly sought to avoid in interpreting Title VII' 99
B. Retaliation for Third-Party Activities
On a lesser note, though only because it is not as recurrent an issue as
matters of adverse employment action, employer retaliation against third parties
who have not themselves engaged in protected conduct also creates important
division among the courts. However, unlike the issue of adverse action, the plain
language of the employment statutes, providing as it does that an employee is
198. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 847-48 (1997).
199. Id. at 848.
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protected only for his own activity, does not support a broad, more equitable
reading of the anti-retaliation clauses. However, the equitable mandates of the
Robinson Court also may provide a starting point for employees in such cases.
The Court in Robinson sternly warned against courts creating "perverse
incentives for employers to fire employees" and "undermining the effectiveness
of Title VII,"2 both of which are clearly encouraged by allowing retaliation for
third parties' protected activities. Nonetheless, despite the Robinson decision,
more conservative courts are inarguably more justified in their treatment of cases
in this area than they are in their treatment of employees alleging adverse
employment action that is less than an ultimate employment decision.
C. Conclusion
Without question, an inherent tension exists between protecting the fights
of one engaged in protected activity and ensuring the efficient operation of
businesses in the management of their employees. This tension surfaces in the
"ultimate employment decision" cases, where the courts appear to regard anti-
retaliation clauses as creating yet another cumbersome statutory civil right that
an employee can use to harass and hinder her employer. Great danger exists in
importing that philosophy into the construction of the statutes, which are
otherwise clear in their protective intent. But, on the other hand, more liberal
courts should utilize caution before expanding the reach of the statutes beyond
their intended scope and literal terms.
200. Id.
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